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my gratitude for his invitation to deliver a paper at his university in Amsterdam. 




The usual translation of “vis maior” is superior force. “Vis cui resisti non potest” 
could be translated as a force which one cannot resist. Dogmatically, both 
terms are considered equivalent. However, another expression which also 
corresponds must be added, namely "casus".2 Nevertheless, “vis maior” 
expresses the force in an objective way, while on the other hand "vis cui resisti 
non potest" is subjective. Ernst states that the question regarding the objective 
or the subjective analysis of superior force has been a bone of contention 
during the epoch of the ius commune as well as during the period of the 
Pandectists.3 
Subjective superior force is a force against which there is nothing to do, even if 
one is trying very hard. Objective superior force is the instance which 
corresponds to an event of extraordinary violence. In this respect some jurists, 
like Mayer-Maly, speak of a "list of catastrophes" ("Katastrophenliste").4 
 
                                                      
1  This text is a revised version of the paper given at the Edinburgh Roman Law Group, on 
25 April 2003.  
2  See e.g. Robinson "Casus in the Digest" in: (JF: editor please) Essays in Honour of 
Ben Beinart II (1979) 337-345. 
3  Ernst, "Wandlungen des 'vis maior'-Begriffes in der Entwicklung der römischen 
Rechtswissenschaft“ 1994 INDEX, 293f. 
4  Mayer-Maly, “Höhere Gewalt: Falltypen und Begriffsbildung“ in: (JF: editor please) 
Festschrift Arthur Steinwenter (1958) 63. 
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The paper does not aim at offering a new dogmatic and unified definition of 
superior force; the impossibility of success in this regard has been 
demonstrated by numerous failures of those who have tried to do so. The 
analysis and the explanation of these failures may be found in the articles by 
Mayer-Maly and Ernst.5 
The recent analysis by Ernst deserves attention. He explains that the concept 
evolved over time. Until this stage of the argument there is no reason to 
disagree. Ernst explains that at first superior force was "Sachbezogen" (that is, 
related to the thing). This means that superior force could not discharge a 
person of his responsibility, but let the risk fall on the owner. In this respect, 
there is no question of "Zufall" (hazard). It is only the application of the idea: 
“Loss must lie where it falls.” Later, superior force became "Leistungsbezogen" 
(related to performance). This means that it could become a justification for 
unlawful behaviour; some wrongdoers could be released. In this further 
development of superior force, the idea of hazard ("Zufall") made its 
appearance.  
In my opinion, Ernst’s distinction is not very different from the distinction 
between the objective and subjective analysis of superior force. Admitting that 
a thing has been destroyed by a violent event without wondering who would be 
responsible, but only considering that it is bad luck for the owner, is a way to 
avoid subjective analysis. My doubts increase when I read the examples used 
by Ernst regarding superior force which would be related to the thing 
("Sachbezogen"). A random example will be used to explain this point: 
Digest 19.2.59 (Iav. 5 Lab. Post.). Marcius domum faciendam a Flacco 
conduxerat: deinde operis parte effecta terrae motu concussum erat 
aedificium. Massurius Sabinus, si vi naturali, veluti terrae motu hoc 
acciderit, Flacci esse periculum. 
It is correct that Sabinus does not say that Marcius is freed by superior force, 
but simply that Flaccus bears the risk. However, the question arises whether it 
                                                      
5  Cf. supra n. 3 and n. 4. 
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is possible to dissociate the two aspects of the decision? I’m not persuaded 
that by attributing the risk to Flaccus, Sabinus didn’t realise that it had as a 
necessary consequence that Marcius didn’t bear the risk. It is difficult to 
comprehend that a jurist would dissociate these aspects.  
2  Chronology: Development from an objective to a 
subjective analysis 
In contrast, the development from an objective to a subjective analysis of 
superior force is without doubt correct. Such development must have been 
parallel to that of iniuria in the lex Aquilia. It is trite that the actio legis Aquiliae 
departs from the premise that the damage was caused unlawfully (objective 
analysis). It is only later that it was admitted – as may be seen in the Institutes 
of Gaius6 – that there was iniuria in each instance of dolus or culpa (subjective 
analysis):  
Gaius, Institutes 3.211:7 Is iniuria autem occidere intellegitur, cuius 
dolo aut culpa id acciderit, nec ulla alia lege damnum, quod sine iniuria 
datur, reprehenditur; itaque inpunitus est, qui sine culpa et dolo malo 
casu quodam damnum committit. 
This development can also be retraced from the following text: 
Digest 47.9.3.7 (Ulp. 56 ad ed.).8 Quod ait praetor de damno dato, ita 
demum locum habet, si dolo damnum datum sit: nam si dolus malus 
absit, cessat edictum. Quemadmodum ergo procedit, quod Labeo 
scribit, si defendendi mei causa vicini aedificium orto incendio 
dissipaverim, et meo nomine et familiae iudicium in me dandum? Cum 
enim defendendarum mearum aedium causa fecerim, utique dolo 
careo. Puto igitur non esse verum, quod Labeo scribit. An tamen lege 
                                                      
6  Schipani Responsabilità "ex lege Aquilia". Criteri di imputazione e problema della "culpa" 
(1969) 249ff is of the opinion that Gaius’ explanation is only the result of a simplification 
for teaching purposes and doesn’t imply that iniuria may be confined to culpa and dolus.  
7  On this text, see for example La Rosa "Il valore originario di 'iniuria' nella 'lex Aquilia'" 
1998 Labeo  366ff. 
8  On this text, see also my book "Aeque Perituris", une approche de la causalité 
dépassante en droit romain classique (1997) 98-114. 
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aquilia agi cum hoc possit? Et non puto agendum: nec enim iniuria hoc 
fecit, qui se tueri voluit, cum alias non posset. Et ita Celsus scribit. 
The praetor gave the action de incendio ruina naufragio rate nave expugnata 
(hereafter: actio de incendio) against anyone who committed theft, received 
and concealed stolen goods or caused damage during a fire, the collapse of a 
house, or shipwreck. 
With regard to the third element (causing damage) Ulpian specifies that the 
action for fourfold will be granted only in the event that the damage was 
caused intentionally (by dolus). In this respect, Ulpian does not agree with 
Labeo, according to whom the action must be granted even against the person 
who pulled the house down in order to preserve his own house against a fire. 
According to Ulpian, one who pulls down a house in such a situation is not 
guilty of dolus. On this occasion, Ulpian reminds us with approval of Celsus, 
who had stated that the actio legis Aquiliae will not be applicable either, 
because he who cannot act differently does not commit an iniuria.9 
Thus, two actions are under discussion. If the question is approached from the 
point of view of Aquilian liability, Celsus’ and Ulpian’s solution proposes the 
adoption of a subjective analysis of liability. If the problem is approached only 
objectively, the conclusion must be reached that the damage was caused by 
the neighbour and not by the fire. To admit that the pulling down of the house 
was neither an iniuria nor committed with dolus, a subjective analysis of liability 
was unavoidable.  
The other action (actio de incendio) – as has been pointed out – was granted 
when damage had been caused by fire. When this action was integrated in the 
praetor’s edict, the notion of iniuria probably had not received a subjective 
interpretation. But, this was irrelevant in respect of the actio de incendio 
because iniuria was not a requirement as such. This raises the question what 
would happen if someone pulled down a house in order to protect his own 
house against fire (damnum incendii arcendi causa datum)? Labeo logically 
                                                      
9  Celsus’ opinion is also reported in D.9.2.49.1 (see infra). 
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answers the question by stating that the action must be granted. However, 
Ulpian draws an analogy between the actio de incendio and the result which 
would have been reached with the action on the lex Aquilia in similar 
circumstances. He refers to Celsus’ opinion stating that the action would not be 
granted in such an instance. This opinion of Celsus is found in Digest 9.2.49.1 
(Ulp., 9 Disp.):10 
Quod dicitur damnum iniuria datum Aquilia persequi, sic erit 
accipiendum, ut videatur damnum iniuria datum, quod cum damno 
iniuriam attulerit; nisi magna vi cogente fuerit factum, ut Celsus 
scribit circa eum, qui incendii arcendi gratia vicinas aedes intercidit: 
nam hic scribit cessare legis Aquiliae actionem: iusto enim metu 
ductus, ne ad se ignis perveniret, vicinas aedes intercidit: et sive 
pervenit ignis sive ante extinctus est, existimat legis Aquiliae 
actionem cessare. 
 
According to Celsus, the action based on the lex Aquilia should be refused 
because there was no iniuria when a house was pulled down to protect oneself 
against fire. A comparison between the two actions appears to lead to an 
illogical difference: No finding for damages with the actio legis Aquiliae, but 
condemnatio to fourfold with the actio de incendio. 
In the time of Labeo the above situation seems to have been accepted, but in 
Ulpian’s time the matter had changed11 because dolus had been integrated into 
the edict and the action de incendio now had three requirements, namely fire, 
damage and dolus. This meant that in Labeo’s time, the liability for damage 
caused by fire was evaluated objectively, but at a later stage became 
evaluated subjectively. 
Fire is traditionally considered a case of vis maior, but in Ulpian’s text it is to be 
analysed subjectively: "cum alias non posset". This formulation makes one 
think of the vis cui resisti non potest. In the parallel text in the Digest 
(D.9.2.49.1), the evaluation is equally subjective, as it is said that the one who 
                                                      
10  On this text, see Gerkens (n. 8) 85-98. 
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pulled the house down, acted iusto metu ductus, driven by a legitimate fear. 
Thus, when the concepts of culpa and iniuria began to be evaluated in a 
subjective manner, the circumstances which could eliminate culpa and/or 
iniuria must have followed the same development. This is clearly the case in 
the texts dealing with damage caused to ward off fire. The fact that the 
subjective evaluation of vis maior had been introduced did not mean that the 
Roman jurists would not on occasion continue to evaluate superior force in the 
traditional and objective way. When a natural and extraordinary event causes 
damage, one cannot institute proceedings against nature. This does not 
surprise, as we know that Roman law developed casuistically. It is logical that 
the subjective evaluation was used only where the circumstances required it. If 
the same result could be reached by using the objective analysis of superior 
force there was no need to complicate things unnecessarily.  
3 Superior force versus human action 
In the above examples, superior force eliminated unlawfulness from the human 
action. Thus, pulling down the neighbour’s house in order to ward off fire was 
without culpa, because superior force instigated a legitimate fear in the 
perpetrator (iusto metu ductus). This is the normal role superior force plays in 
the questions of contractual liability; confer Javolenus in Digest 19.2.59, where 
he states that it is not Marcius’ fault that the house was not completed, since 
the earthquake had demolished his work. 
However, texts can also be found in the Digest according to which superior 
force is not considered in terms of the effect it had on human actions, but 
where superior force and human action are both considered in order to 
determine to whom the damage will be ascribed. One of such cases is the 
previously discussed case where a house was pulled down to ward off fire. 
This is not the contradiction it appears to be where cases in which human 
action is analysed separately from superior force and actually placed in 
competition with it, are in conflict with instances such as the example of the 
                                                      
11  About this development see Gerkens (n. 8) 108ff. 
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house pulled down as the result of a legitimate fear. This would be the case if 
there were only the two texts which have been discussed supra. In these two 
texts, the iniuria of pulling down the house is covered by the fact that it was 
done in reaction to superior force. 
There is, however, a third text, in which the problem is phrased in a different 
manner:  
Digest 43.24.7.4 (Ulp., 71 ad ed.).12 Est et alia exceptio, de qua Celsus 
dubitat, an sit obicienda: ut puta si incendii arcendi causa vicini aedes 
intercidi et quod vi aut clam mecum agatur aut damni iniuria. Gallus 
enim dubitat, an excipi oporteret: "Quod incendii defendendi causa 
factum non sit"? Servius autem ait, si id magistratus fecisset, dandam 
esse, privato non esse idem concedendum: si tamen quid vi aut clam 
factum sit neque ignis usque eo pervenisset, simpli litem aestimandam 
: si pervenisset, absolvi eum oportere. Idem ait esse, si damni iniuria 
actum foret, quoniam nullam iniuriam aut damnum dare videtur aeque 
perituris aedibus. Quod si nullo incendio id feceris, deinde postea 
incendium ortum fuerit, non idem erit dicendum, quia non ex post 
facto, sed ex praesenti statu, damnum factum sit nec ne, aestimari 
oportere Labeo ait. 
The facts remain the same: Fire progresses towards a house; the owner 
thereof pulls down the house of a neighbour which is located between his 
house and the fire in order to protect his house. The difference between this 
text and the other two texts is that on this occasion the remedy used against 
the perpetrator is the interdictum quod vi aut clam (the interdict for what has 
been done by force or by stealth).13 In short, it is a procedure in which an 
urgent measure is requested from the praetor in cases where someone has 
suffered a violent act, which he in vain tried to resist. The praetor grants such 
an interdict which orders the wrongdoer to stop the violence or repair the 
damage already caused by such violence. The peculiarity of this interdict is 
                                                      
12  See Gerkens (n. 8) 33-84. 
13  On this interdict, see for example Fargnoli Studi sulla legittimazione attiva all’interdetto 
quod vi aut clam (1998). 
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that it does not take the fire into account as a factor eliminating iniuria. In this 
aspect, the interdict differs from the action of the lex Aquilia, as it was not 
necessary to have acted unlawfully to have the interdict granted. All that was 
required was a violent action and damage. These two requirements preclude 
taking into account possible subjective circumstances deriving from superior 
force. This is probably the reason why the possibility of an exceptio was 
discussed by Gallus and Celsus, as the exceptio would allow the subjective 
circumstance deriving from superior force to be taken into account. However, 
the text refused the exceptio to a private person. 
The fact that the exceptio was granted to magistrates was in all probability to 
empower them to fight fire efficiently without the risk of interruption by a 
praetorian procedure. This exceptio was only of use to magistrates without 
imperium, that is the only ones who could be summoned before the praetor in 
the course of their duty.14  
The case of the private person to whom the exceptio is not granted, is of 
interest. This raises the question whether a private person could invoke the fire 
to escape liability for damages pursuant to the interdict. This is not exactly the 
case. The private person cannot rely on the fact that he was in legitimate fear 
of the fire; on the other hand there is an objective consequence of the superior 
force which may help the defendant. This objective circumstance is whether 
damage was suffered or not. As stated above, damage was one of the 
indispensable requirements to obtain sentence to make good the damage 
caused by violence.15 This leads to the question whether it is relevant to 
discuss the existence of damage as it is difficult to doubt the existence thereof 
when the house has been destroyed.16 In the text under discussion, Ulpian and 
Servius are of the opinion that if the fire reached the ruins of the house pulled 
down, there was neither iniuria nor damage. The absence of iniuria is relevant 
only as far as the lex Aquilia is concerned, while on the other hand the 
                                                      
14  Robinson “Fire prevention in Rome” 1977 RIDA 380, who suggests that it could be an 
aedile. See also Gerkens (n. 8) 60ff. 
15  See Berger "Interdictum", in RE 9/2 (1916) 1663; Schipani, (n. 6) 157; Capogrossi 
Colognesi, "L’interdetto 'quod vi aut clam' e il suo ambito di applicazione” 1993 INDEX, 
234f. 
16  Cf  Gerkens (n. 8) 82ff.  
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absence of damage concerns both remedies. The fact that there is no damage 
does not mean that the house has not been destroyed, but that it would have 
been destroyed in any event. Thus, the distinction whether the fire had 
progressed to the ruins of the pulled-down house is only of interest in respect 
of the absence of damnum and therefore for the interdict quod vi aut clam. This 
is the first case in which a single instance of damage may be ascribed either to 
a human action or to superior force. 
Servius, Labeo and Ulpian choose to ascribe the destruction of the house to 
superior force where the fire had started at the moment the house was pulled 
down and also reached the ruins of the house. In such an instance the superior 
force is a hypothetical fact causing the damage, but is not purely hypothetical. 
At a certain moment, the superior force must have been really able to cause 
the damage, which would not have been the case if it had been purely 
hypothetical ─ as would be the case if a neighbour had pulled down the house 
prior to the fire starting. 
This analysis also explains Labeo’s position in the case of the actio de 
incendio. As stated, Labeo granted this action even when the house was pulled 
down incendii arcendi causa, since this action was granted whenever damage 
had been caused by fire. The fact that Labeo granted the action de incendio 
even if the damage had been caused incendii arcendi causa should not 
surprise, as we know that during his epoch dolus was not a requirement for 
granting the action. It appears that this requirement was added during the time 
of Ulpian. However, this does not mean that Labeo’s solution should 
necessarily be considered iniquitous, for Labeo probably did not grant the actio 
de incendio where the fire did not reach the ruins of the pulled-down house for 
the same reason as he denied the interdict quod vi aut clam, namely, because 
there was no damage. It may also be considered a justification of the 
neighbour’s intervention. Fire should not authorise pulling down houses without 
due consideration. The danger must be real, and this element may be 
evaluated objectively (no damage) as well as subjectively (legitimate fear). 
There are other fragments in the Digest dealing with cases in which human 
action and superior force compete. For example, the case of the wild boar, 
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trapped in a snare dealt with in Digest 41.1.55 (Proc., 2 epist.):17 
In laqueum, quem venandi causa posueras, aper incidit: cum eo haereret, 
exemptum eum abstuli: num tibi videor tuum aprum abstulisse? et si tuum 
putas fuisse, si solutum eum in silvam dimisissem, eo casu tuus esse 
desisset an maneret? et quam actionem mecum haberes, si desisset tuus 
esse, num in factum dari oportet, quaero. respondit: laqueum videamus ne 
intersit in publico an in privato posuerim et, si in privato posui, utrum in 
meo an in alieno, et, si in alieno, utrum permissu eius cuius fundus erat an 
non permissu eius posuerim: praeterea utrum in eo ita haeserit aper, ut 
expedire se non possit ipse, an diutius luctando expediturus se fuerit. 
summam tamen hanc puto esse, ut, si in meam potestatem pervenit, meus 
factus sit. sin autem aprum meum ferum in suam naturalem laxitatem 
dimisisses et eo facto meus esse desisset, actionem mihi in factum dari 
oportere, veluti responsum est, cum quidam poculum alterius ex nave 
eiecisset. 
What is interesting in this text is the eventuality that the hunter becomes owner 
of the boar owing to the fact that it fell in his snare. A passer-by freed the boar, 
although it could have extricated itself by a long struggle (diutius luctando). In 
this case the damage results from freeing the boar, as a consequence of which 
the hunter lost his property. Thus there is damage, but the question remains 
what was the cause of this damage? It could have been the fact that the 
passer-by freed the boar and if he had not done so, the animal would have 
escaped by itself. The animal’s struggle is not usually referred to as superior 
force. This is due to the fact that the damage itself is unusual as it is non 
corpori (the boar is not damaged). Although there was no destruction, there 
was considerable natural force. If the boar had been able to free itself, the 
passer-by would not have been considered liable for the hunter’s loss. 
Another fragment is also found in the title of the Digest concerning the action 
de incendio namely Digest 47.9.4.pr. + 1 (Paul., 54 ad ed.):18 
                                                      
17  On this text see Gerkens (n. 8) 121-152. 
18  See Gerkens (n. 8) 152-158. 
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Pedius posse etiam dici ex naufragio rapere, qui, dum naufragium 
fiat, in illa trepidatione rapiat. 1. Divus Antoninus de his, qui 
praedam ex naufragio diripuissent, ita rescripsit: Quod de naufragiis 
navis et ratis scripsisti mihi, eo pertinet, ut explores, qua poena 
adficiendos eos putem, qui diripuisse aliqua ex illo probantur. et 
facile, ut opinor, constitui potest: nam plurimum interest, peritura 
collegerint an quae servari possint flagitiose invaserint. (...) 
This text deals with goods that have been taken from a shipwreck. If the goods 
were perishable and were about to perish, it is not reprehensible to take them. 
The concurrence in this instance is between the shipwreck (as superior force) 
and the taking of the goods (as human action). 
Another case is found in Digest 9.2.15.1 (Ulp., 18 ad ed.):19 
Si servus vulneratus mortifere postea ruina vel naufragio vel alio 
ictu maturius perierit, de occiso agi non posse, sed quasi de 
vulnerato, sed si manumissus vel alienatus ex vulnere periit, quasi 
de occiso agi posse Iulianus ait. haec ita tam varie, quia verum est 
eum a te occisum tunc cum vulnerabas, quod mortuo eo demum 
apparuit: at in superiore non est passa ruina apparere an sit 
occisus. sed si vulneratum mortifere liberum et heredem esse 
iusseris, deinde decesserit, heredem eius agere Aquilia non posse. 
This text deals with a mortally wounded slave. It is certain that he will die of his 
wounds; but fate hastens his death by some form of superior force. In this 
case, instead of considering the assailant liable for killing (first chapter of the 
lex Aquilia) it is decided that he is only liable for wounding (third chapter of the 
lex Aquilia). This is another instance of a concurrence of superior force and 
human action. The damage (the death of the slave) is ascribed only to the 
superior force. It is true that the assailant is nevertheless liable ex vulnerato, 
but on this point the decision is consistent with the opinions of Labeo and 
Ulpian in the case of the fire when the fire started after the house had been 
pulled down. In that case, the fire came too late to be of any help to the person 
                                                      
19  See Gerkens (n. 8) 184-197. 
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who had pulled down the house. For the wounded slave the superior force also 
came too late as far as the wounding of the slave was concerned, but not with 
regard to the killing. It is interesting to note that this text has caused enormous 
interpretation problems.20 It is all a question of context. In the context of this 
paper it probably seems logical. There are, however, two parallel texts, also 
dealing with cases of mortally wounded slaves, namely Digest 9.2.11.3 (Ulp., 
18 ad ed.)21 and Digest 9.2.51 (Iul., 86 Dig.).22 
Digest 9.2.11.3: Celsus scribit, si alius mortifero vulnere percusserit, 
alius postea exanimaverit, priorem quidem non teneri quasi occiderit, 
sed quasi vulneraverit, quia ex alio vulnere periit, posteriorem teneri, 
quia occidit. quod et Marcello videtur et est probabilius. 
 
Digest 9.2.51.pr: Ita vulneratus est servus, ut eo ictu certum esset 
moriturum: medio deinde tempore heres institutus est et postea ab alio 
ictus decessit: quaero, an cum utroque de occiso lege Aquilia agi 
possit. respondit: occidisse dicitur vulgo quidem, qui mortis causam 
quolibet modo praebuit: sed lege Aquilia is demum teneri visus est, qui 
adhibita vi et quasi manu causam mortis praebuisset, tracta videlicet 
interpretatione vocis a caedendo et a caede. rursus Aquilia lege teneri 
existimati sunt non solum qui ita vulnerassent, ut confestim vita 
privarent, sed etiam hi, quorum ex vulnere certum esset aliquem vita 
excessurum. igitur si quis servo mortiferum vulnus inflixerit eundemque 
alius ex intervallo ita percusserit, ut maturius interficeretur, quam ex 
priore vulnere moriturus fuerat, statuendum est utrumque eorum lege 
Aquilia teneri. 
                                                      
20  See Schindler “Ein Streit zwischen Julian und Celsus” 1957 ZSS 201ff.; Pugsley, 
“Causation and confessions in the lex Aquilia“ 1970 TR, 163ff.; Ankum, "Das Problem 
der 'überholenden Kausalität' bei der Anwendung der lex Aquilia im klassischen 
römischen Recht", in: (JF: editor please) Festgabe von Lübtow zum 80. Geburtstag 
(1980), 352ff.; Willvonseder, Die Verwendung der Denkfigur der "condicio sine qua non" 
bei den römischen Juristen (1984), 144ff. 
21  See Gerkens (n. 8) 159-163. 
22  See Gerkens (n. 8) 163-184 and more recently Börsch, Damit Übeltaten nicht ungestraft 
bleiben. Impunitas als Argument der klassischen römischen Juristen (2003), 28-47. 
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1. Idque est consequens auctoritati veterum, qui, cum a pluribus 
idem servus ita vulneratus esset, ut non appareret cuius ictu 
perisset, omnes lege Aquilia teneri iudicaverunt. 
2. Aestimatio autem perempti non eadem in utriusque persona fiet: 
nam qui prior vulneravit, tantum praestabit, quanto in anno proximo 
homo plurimi fuerit repetitis ex die vulneris trecentum sexaginta 
quinque diebus, posterior in id tenebitur, quanti homo plurimi venire 
poterit in anno proximo, quo vita excessit, in quo pretium quoque 
hereditatis erit. eiusdem ergo servi occisi nomine alius maiorem, 
alius minorem aestimationem praestabit, nec mirum, cum uterque 
eorum ex diversa causa et diversis temporibus occidisse hominem 
intellegatur. quod si quis absurde a nobis haec constitui putaverit, 
cogitet longe absurdius constitui neutrum lege Aquilia teneri aut 
alterum potius, cum neque impunita maleficia esse oporteat nec 
facile constitui possit, uter potius lege teneatur. multa autem iure 
civili contra rationem disputandi pro utilitate communi recepta esse 
innumerabilibus rebus probari potest: unum interim proposuisse 
contentus ero. cum plures trabem alienam furandi causa 
sustulerint, quam singuli ferre non possent, furti actione omnes 
teneri existimantur, quamvis subtili ratione dici possit neminem 
eorum teneri, quia neminem verum sit eam sustulisse. 
These two fragments are very different from the first text discussed. In the 
latter texts there is no question of superior force. This distinction is obvious, 
because this paper deals with superior force. However, the authors who have 
analysed the cases of the mortally wounded slaves make no mention of the 
distinction.23 Reference is usually only made to the controversy between 
Ulpian, Celsus and Marcellus on the one hand and Julian on the other hand. 
The situation is aggravated by the fact that Julian appears to contradict 
himself. In the last text, he explains in great detail why the first assailant should 
be considered liable for killing in spite of the fact that the slave eventually died 
of the second blow. In the first text, where the mortally wounded slave died as 
                                                      
23  See Ankum (n. 20) 352ff. Ankum tries to change the meaning of Julian’s text by 
changing the punctuation of D.9.2.15.1 in order to avoid what many authors believe to 
be a contradiction in Julian’s way of thinking because of what he writes in D.9.2.51. 
14 "Vis maior" and "vis cui resisti non potest"   
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a result of superior force, the assailant was only held liable for wounding. 
It is submitted that Julian did not contradict himself. On the contrary, following 
his long reasoning in Digest 9.2.51, we can understand that the different 
conclusion is due to the fact that where a human action is weighed against 
superior force, the damage is ascribed to the superior force. In contrast, when 
two human actions are concurring, there is no reason to favour one above the 
other. This would authorise both assailants to defend themselves by accusing 
the other, and the crime would stay unpunished. It is clear that such impunity 
poses no problem where damage is ascribed to superior force. In the absence 
of superior force impunity becomes unacceptable. This change indicates a 
tendency to favour the imputation of damages to superior force or fate. 
Traces of this way of thinking can also be found in other texts of the Digest, as 
in Digest 39.3.2.6 (Paul., lib. 49 ad ed.):
24
 
(...) Labeo (...) ait enim naturam agri ipsam a se mutari posse et 
ideo, cum per se natura agri fuerit mutata, aequo animo 
unumquemque ferre debere,25 sive melior sive deterior eius 
condicio facta sit. Idcirco et si terrae motu aut tempestatis 
magnitudine soli causa mutata sit, neminem cogi posse, ut sinat in 
pristinam locum condicionem redigi. (...) 
 
4 Conclusion 
It appears that the Romans reasoned in a reverse way to today. Modern law 
does not favour fate. Modern times has many ways and means to escape fate, 
for example by using insurance. Life is organised to maximise the suppression 
of the consequences of bad luck. For the Romans, bad luck was part of life. It 
was not necessary to find a guilty or an accountable party at any price. On 
occasion fate was used as an acceptable reason to justify damages. 
                                                      
24  On this text see Gerkens "Exégèse de Paul, D. 39, 3, 2, 6” 1995 TR, 11-26. See also 
Sitzia, Aqua pluvia e natura agri (1999); Bretone, I fondamenti del diritto romano (2001) 
261ff. 
25  On these words (aequo animo ferre) see Mayer-Maly, "Aequo animo ferre," in “MNHMH” 
Georges A. Petropoulos (1984) 105ff. (JF, is this a Festschrift? If so, please supply 
editor's name) 
